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“People who shut their eyes to reality simply invite their own destruction, 
and anyone who insists on remaining in a state of innocence long after that 
innocence is dead turns himself into a monster.”             




he worldly events that determine our lives don’t come 
prepackaged with a transparent way to interpret them.  We 
give them significance, and these meanings diverge.  People 
earnestly impute meanings to social and political events using ideas 
that others can barely conceive without caricature.   
Often this disconnect arises from differences in habituated 
worldviews, as with incompatible conceptions of freedom, equality, 
justice, identity, and responsibility that inform the so-called “culture 
wars” between American conservatives and progressives.  Deeper still, 
disconnects arise from tragic failures to communicate across what 
James Baldwin called “levels of experience.”  In Baldwin’s 
interpretation, the putative state of innocence of a life typified by 
Doris Day’s songs of the 1940s and 50s is ruthlessly protected against 
any genuine dialectical encounter with the struggles of a life typified 
by Ray Charles’s blues.  It would help, Baldwin implied, if our 
country’s Doris Days worked harder to “get” the blues (cf. Glaude 2007 
and 2020). At any rate, when people impute meanings to events--such 
as the 2020 killing of George Floyd, the shooting of Jacob Blake, and 
subsequent upheavals--they do so with ideas that already make sense 
to them.  And what makes most sense to people is typically due to 
others with whom they share identities and life experiences, and from 
whom they’ve inherited their basic intellectual scaffolding.   
But making sense of an event isn’t enough.  We’re driven to 
mobilize sustained action by convincing ourselves that our cause is 
morally or politically in the right.  So people build on their stable-yet-
T 
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evolving intellectual scaffolding and explanatory schemes to 
rationalize, justify, and sanctify their conduct.  Contemporary moral 
psychologists make a related point that what goes by the name of 
“moral reasoning” often amounts to little more than a self-justifying, 
ineffectual “rider” (reason) atop the headstrong “elephant” of 
habituated intuitions (Haidt 2012).  
 
Becoming a Moral Monster 
 
The easiest part of becoming what Baldwin called a moral monster is 
to cultivate only those beliefs and values that confirm pre-existing 
desires and biases.  The more complicated part is to construct a 
justifying consciousness that allays any doubts as to the rightness of 
our behaviors.  This self-justifying consciousness insures that we’ll 
arrive safely at foregone conclusions with little risk of confronting 
others’ experiences in a way that might unsettle our equilibrium or sap 
our vehemence.  As Dewey observed in a 1916 essay on “The Mind of 
Germany,” this subtle work requires us to build up a system of beliefs 
that “effectively mask from view whatever would trouble action were 
it recognized” (MW 10:217).  With such rationalizing beliefs in place, 
people avoid facing realities that might upend their pretenses, and 
they can deny the social and material conditions they need to deny in 
order to stay their course, so they are now ideally positioned to be, in 
Dewey’s words, “profoundly moral even in their immoralities” (217).   
Take a couple of examples of how we can become moral 
monsters, beginning with the construction of a self-justifying 
consciousness about structural discrimination. When a group of 
people who occupy positions of caste-like systemic dominance 
(Wilkerson, 2020) consistently holds that racial injustice is largely a 
bygone chapter of American history (“All Lives Matter”), or that the 
movement for black lives simply plays up victimhood as a red herring 
for laziness, this group sees no point in dialogue with those who could 
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unsettle and disarm their self-justified inaction.  After all, from their 
little seat atop their elephantine unacknowledged habits, most 
members of this group reason that once the institution of slavery was 
ended, residual racial injustice was based on a lingering individual 
character defect called “racism.” Now that most members of the 
dominant “caste” don’t consciously feel racist anymore, they believe 
racial injustice is limited to a few bad apples who utter racial slurs, 
commit hate crimes, spew racial hatred, and blatantly discriminate. 
These must be chastened or prosecuted, they insist, but systemic racial 
injustice is water under the bridge.    
As a related example, many contemporary white Americans 
believe that racial justice is a zero-sum game that they are losing 
(Norton and Sommers, 2011).  On that view, black gains are white 
losses, so a tragic black loss—disproportionate Covid-19 deaths, 
driving while black, being arrested while black, walking away from an 
officer while black, jogging while black--may seem to matter a bit less 
than it might otherwise. Of course, most who labor under this 
intellectual habit will blanch at the immoderate crassness of the 
avowed white supremacist who, Confederate flag in hand, declares 
that these losses help to even the score. This seems a bridge too far to 
them.  
Nevertheless, to hold the zero-sum view of racial justice is to 
dwell in an intellectual house designed to keep its occupants’ faces 
turned away from the persistent institutionalized conditions that 
break black bodies and souls. Most zero-sum adherents hold that 
they’re already the kind of people that a democracy requires (they’re 
the least racist people they’ve ever met), so what hope is there for 
enlisting them in creating a new context for becoming such people, 
when their prior commitment is to go on living and thinking as they 
do?  
People’s ideational scaffoldings operate as neural paths of least 
resistance.  A century ago, Dewey discussed this in terms of the 
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deliberately imprecise term “habit,” as part of his rejection of the 
traditional European model of free-willing, autonomous moral 
agency.  In Dewey’s idiom, “habits” encompass not only private 
behavioral patterns but also pre-established social circuits, what 
journalist Isabel Wilkerson recently called our “neurological societal 
downloads” (2020, 71).   For good and ill, our complex, relatively 
stable, and often contradictory horizon of internalized social habits 
sets the scene for how we relate to others, how we understand 
situations, and what we see as possible courses of action.  They 
organize the implicit background of our everyday interactions.  This 
includes often-unspoken biases and stereotypes as well as our routine 
habits of thinking about race, such as the tendency to reduce racial 
injustice to individual intentions instead of thinking of it in terms of a 
systemic “value gap” that discounts black lives and livelihoods (Glaude, 
2016).  We see dimly, if at all, beyond this interpretive horizon, from 
our most uplifting ideals to our most degrading “racial habits” (on 
which, see Eddie Glaude Jr.’s incisive Dewey-inspired analysis in 
Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves the American Soul (2016, ch. 
3)). Dewey summed up the moral import of all of this in A Common 
Faith:  “The community... in which we, together with those not born, 
are enmeshed... is the matrix within which our ideal aspirations are 
born and bred.  It is the source of the values that the moral imagination 




Moral maturation is an ongoing process in which habits are evaluated 
and reconstructed, whether gradually or suddenly, in light of 
circumstances rather than championed in blind conformity or 
dismissed in reactionary defiance.  “The choice,” Dewey urged, “is not 
between a moral authority outside custom and one within it.  It is 
between adopting more or less intelligent and significant customs” 
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(MW 14:58).  To the degree that we disclose, criticize, evaluate, and 
transform our habituated beliefs, values, and outlooks, we can own 
them imaginatively in the service of nonreactive democratic inquiry 
that sympathetically faces realities.  In turn, insofar as habits own us 
mechanically, democracy is a farce because deliberate choice in that 
case is indistinguishable from mere impulsion.   
In the face of circumstances that overwhelm them, people tend 
to behave much like pinballs ricocheting around a machine.  When 
we’re reactively tossed around, we don’t inquire and communicate, so 
we’re unable to take part in democratically redirecting the course of 
emerging events.  When we’re overwhelmed, we get caught up in a 
reactive cascade that leads us to oversimplify situations, neglect 
context, take refuge in dogmatic absolutes, ignore relevant 
possibilities for convergence, and shut off inquiry.  In this way, we 
make the worst of our native impulses toward social bonding and 
antagonism, and we make it impossible to debate and achieve 
controverted social goals—goals we can only achieve together— like 
justice, security, and health.   
These observations hold regardless of our partisan stripes.  
Every political framework is in some way truncated, the more so if it 
hides from scrutiny by claiming access to a precise latitude and 
longitude of moral rectitude.  By owning up to the fact that we’re all 
self-justifying creatures of habit, we’re less likely to assume that we 
have nothing to learn from those who disagree with us.  No diagnosis 
or proposed solution to a problem is beyond revision and 
reformulation.  Meanwhile, progress in one relevant dimension of a 
problem may be regressive in another dimension, and we’re more 
likely to notice those off-the-radar dimensions if we’ll engage in 
democratic dialogue, debate, and persuasion.  Nevertheless, it would 
be irresponsible here to ignore that a large minority of U.S. residents 
today receive their daily dose of white anger, fear, resentment, and 
parochial antagonism from a self-serving misological president who is 
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advised by white nationalist fanatics (Guerrero, 2020) and is backed 
by the unprecedented right-wing media scope of Fox News, the 
Sinclair Broadcast Group, and Breitbart News. 
We are in profound need of more people who are humane, 
compassionate, active and informed participants in a country that 
sends many Americans daily signals that their lives are of lesser value 
than folks from the other side of their still-segregated hometown.  
One cannot look to Dewey to lay bare the intellectual scaffolding of 
white supremacy (he didn’t understand it) and the demoralizing 
current reality of white retrenchment.  He did not supply an inroad to 
disclosing the matrix of our racial imaginations so that American 
racial habits, along with filters for denial, may be critically appraised.  
(For exceptional work in this direction, see Sullivan 2019 and Glaude 
2007, 2016, and 2020.)  But inspired in part by a critical embrace of 
Dewey, contemporary work in the American philosophical tradition 
that includes theorists such as Patricia Hill Collins (1998, 2019) is 
emphasizing that we understand problems better when we 
democratically inhabit the standpoint of intersecting identities, while 
challenging those who invite destruction by assuming that only their 
own experiences, habituated values, and concerns have overriding 
force when perceiving, diagnosing, and ameliorating problems.  This 
is a call for deeply democratic inquiry.  Through it we may learn our 
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